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1 Introduction
Access pricing constitutes the core of the policy issues regarding interconnected networks.
More precisely, studying how access prices affect competition between networks and de-
termining the optimal access prices form the central questions of the seminal papers on
two-way network interconnection in Telecommunication Industry (Armstrong 1998, Laffont-
Rey-Tirole (LRT, hereafter), 1998a,b) and the papers that followed.1 Although the papers
vary in terms of the retail prices they consider (linear versus non-linear prices, with or with-
out network based price discrimination), the degree of customer heterogeneity and whether
or not they explicitly consider receivers’ surplus, all the papers have a common trait in that
they consider a fixed access price, which is either negotiated bilaterally between two networks
or is fixed by a regulatory agency. In this paper, we make a departure from this standard
approach and consider what we call a retail benchmarking approach. In our approach, we
study access pricing rules that determine the access price that network i pays to network j
as a (linear) function of the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both networks. We
first consider the case of competition in linear prices and derive the optimal access pricing
rule within the class of linear rules. Then we consider the case of competition in two-part
tariffs and study an adaptation of the optimal rule we discovered in the previous case. It
turns out that both rules have some remarkable properties that we explain below.
Although most of the literature on two-way access pricing has moved on from linear
prices to non-linear prices, in this paper we consider both competition in linear prices and
in two-part tariffs, as we think that both of them are relevant. In particular in mobile
telecommunication markets, it is not uncommon for firms to set linear prices by means of
prepaid cards. In 2005, almost half of 40 million mobile phone users in Spain had prepaid
cards. Moreover, many operators in Spain offer consumers contracts with a linear price and
no subscription fee (but with a minimum amount charged monthly). Such contracts are very
much like linear prices. The most recent entrant in the Spanish mobile telecommunication
market, Yoigo, in fact only offers uniform linear prices without subscription fees, without
minimum consumption requirements and without network based price discrimination.
In the case of competition in linear prices, we consider a set of linear access pricing
rules that includes any fixed access price and the well-known Efficient Component Pricing
Rule (ECPR) as particular rules. We show that within this set, there is a unique rule that
1See, for instances, Carter and Wright (1999, 2003), Dessein (2003), Gans and King (2000, 2001), Hahn
(2004), Hermalin and Katz (2001, 2004), Jeon-Laffont-Tirole (2004), Laffont-Marcus-Rey-Tirole (2003),
Valletti and Cambini (2005) and Wright (2002).
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implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of the underlying
demand conditions, as long as there exists at least a mild degree of substitutability between
networks’ services. This optimal rule is such that the mark-up of the access price that
network i pays to network j is equal to the mark-up of network i’s retail price multiplied
by n/(n − 1) where n represents the number of competing networks. This rule promotes
competition in retail prices as network i can decrease its access payment by reducing its
retail price. Since access pricing rules are much more general than fixed access prices, it is
perhaps not that surprising that some rule is able to implement the Ramsey outcome. What
is a very remarkable feature of the optimal access pricing rule is that it does not depend
on the demand structure2 so that the regulator only needs to observe marginal costs and
retail prices and does not need to know anything about the demand side.3 Furthermore, our
model and access pricing rules allow for more than two competing networks.4
In the case of competition in two-part tariffs, we adapt the access pricing rule that is
optimal in the case of linear prices such that the mark-up of the access price above the
termination cost that network i pays to network j is equal to network i’s average retail price
mark-up multiplied by a factor κ.5 We show that under the adapted rules each network finds
it optimal to charge its variable price equal to the true marginal cost for any market share
and for any κ ≤ 1: in fact, when κ = 0, the access price is equal to the termination cost and
LRT (1998a) show that in this case, the variable price is equal to the marginal cost. When
κ = 0, network i’s profit is equal to its market share multiplied by profit per customer (net
of the fixed cost per customer). Therefore, maximizing network i’s profit with respect to its
variable price, while maintaining its market share constant, is equivalent to maximizing its
profit per customer, which leads to the marginal cost pricing. When κ 6= 0, under our access
2Under the LRT assumption of full coverage
3In contrast, under the standard approach of fixed access price (LRT,1998a), (i) the Ramsey access price
must be lower than the termination cost but no equilibrium exists if the access price is different from the
termination cost and the services provided by different networks are substitutable enough; (ii) if access prices
are determined through private negotiations, networks can achieve the monopoly outcome by coordinating
on a certain level of access price; (iii) the Ramsey access price is informationally demanding since it requires
the regulator to possess precise information regarding both the cost and the demand structure.
4Stennek and Tanger˚as (2006) also consider a model that allows for more than two networks. Their
analysis accounts for the fact that the bilaterally agreed upon fixed access price between two networks
affects their competitiveness with respect to other rivals in a setting with linear retail prices. Since network
based price discrimination is not allowed for in the model, the equilibrium retail price set by one particular
network will be influenced by all negotiated access prices. It is shown that, in the absence of regulation,
this competition in access prices has no effect and networks will be able to sustain monopoly retail prices.
However, a light-handed form a regulation (setting a maximum access price) induces networks to set retail
prices close to marginal cost when networks are sufficiently close substitutes.
5It turns out that the rule that implements the Ramsey outcome in case of linear prices gives firms
incentives to set variable price below cost and high fixed fees, generating a high volume of (off-net) calls for
which negative access charges would have to be paid.
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rule, the access payment per customer that network i makes to its rival networks is equal to
a fraction (smaller than one) of its profit per customer (as long as κ ≤ 1). Therefore, our rule
generates the marginal cost pricing as long as κ = 0 does it. For instance, we show that our
rule achieves the marginal cost pricing even when networks face heterogeneous customers
and compete with a menu of two-part tariffs.
Therefore, the competition authority can properly choose κ to pursue another goal while
achieving the efficient pricing in terms of variable price. For instance, since the equilibrium
profit decreases with κ (i.e., the profit neutrality result does not hold within our framework),
κ can be chosen to increase consumer surplus at the expense of firms’ profits. This also
suggests that κ can be chosen to promote penetration in markets where no full coverage
equilibrium exists with fixed access charges. Very interestingly, κ can also be chosen to
increase firms’ profits so as to create incentives for socially optimal investment in network
quality (i.e., to achieve static and dynamic efficiency at the same time).
Making access prices depend on retail prices is an old idea in the case of one-way access.
The well-known ECPR6 achieves the efficient entry by equalizing the access price that an
entrant should pay to the incumbent with the sum of the cost of providing the access and the
latter’s opportunity cost (i.e., the incumbent’s retail price mark-up) when the incumbent’s
retail price is regulated. However, the ECPR is not good at promoting competition in retail
prices when the retail prices are not regulated since the access price that the incumbent
receives increases with its retail price.7 This motivated Sibley et al. (2004) to consider the
Generalized Efficient Component Pricing Rule (GECPR) in which the access price that an
entrant pays is, roughly speaking, equal to the sum of the cost of providing the access and
the entrant’s opportunity cost (i.e., the entrant’s retail price mark-up). They find that since
the entrant can reduce its access charge payment by lowering its retail price, the GECPR is
good at intensifying retail competition.
In the case of two-way access, LRT (1998a) examine various interpretations of the ECPR
in a duopoly framework and show that when networks can privately negotiate on a fixed
level of access price, the ECPR allows them to collude and achieve the monopoly outcome.
More importantly, Mialon (2007) studies the GECPR, considered by Sibley et al. (2004) in
one-way access, in LRT’s framework of duopoly with linear pricing.8 Under the GECPR, the
6See Baumol (1983), Baumol and Sidak (1994) and Willig (1979). For an introduction to the ECPR, see
Armstrong (2002) and Laffont and Tirole (2000).
7Moreover, as Economides and White (1995) point out, the ECPR avoids entry by less efficient entrants
and thus achieves productive efficiency, but this social gain may be more than outweighed by the loss in
consumer surplus by means of foregone competition and high retail prices.
8Doganoglu and Tauman (2002) also consider a linear access pricing rule which depends on retail price.
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mark-up of the access price that network i pays to the rival network is equal to the former’s
retail price mark-up. We show that there exists a unique rule achieving the Ramsey outcome
in the set of linear access pricing rules which includes the GECPR as a special case. Since
the optimal rule is different from the GECPR, the GECPR does not achieve the Ramsey
outcome.9
In practice, there are cases in which access prices (or termination charges) are linked
to average retail prices. Some countries use a “retail-minus” approach to set access prices
on the basis of a fixed discount off the corresponding retail prices. (See OECD, 2004.)
Another example of pegging access price to retail tariffs can be found in the international
postal service. For instance, access prices (i.e., what they call “termination dues”) among
European countries should be set at 80% of domestic tariffs (Ghosal, 2002). In the context
of termination charges for mobile phone service, the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (2001) adopted what they call a “retail benchmarking approach”, which means
that “access prices for GSM termination will fall at the same rate as retail prices for mobile
services provided by a mobile carrier (p.89).” However, the ACCC retail benchmarking
approach is different from ours in several respects. The most important difference is that
the ACCC linked the access price charged by an operator to the average retail price of
the same operator, similar to what occurs in the ECPR. The ACCC recognized that this
could potentially give disincentives to lower retail prices (p. 75), as we explained above.
However, the ACCC relied on the competitive pressure in the retail market to continue retail
price reductions observed in previous years, which would then imply access price reductions,
which in turn could reinforce lower retail prices. In 2004 the ACCC abandoned their retail
benchmarking approach, mainly because retail prices had in fact not (significantly) decreased
in the period 2001-2004.10 Another difference between the ACCC approach and our proposal
is that the ACCC considered intertemporal linkages (access prices in the next six month
period depend on retail prices reductions in the last six month period) whereas we consider
instantaneous linkages. A final difference with our rule is that we propose to benchmark
retail and access price mark-ups, whereas the ACCC benchmarked absolute retail and access
prices.
More precisely, in their paper, the access price that network i receives from network j is a (positive and)
constant fraction of the linear retail price that network i charges. This rule is included as a special case in
the set of the access pricing rules that we consider. As is explained in section 3, this kind of rule cannot be
optimal since network i has an incentive to increase (rather than reduce) its retail price in order to receive
a higher access payment.
9In fact, the equilibrium price under the GECPR is higher than the Ramsey price.
10See, ACCC (2004).
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Our result in Section 4 that there is a class of access pricing rules which achieve ef-
ficiency when networks face heterogeneous consumers and compete in menus of two-part
tariffs is interesting in its own right. Previously, Dessein (2003) and Hahn (2004) find that
when the access price is equal to the termination cost (i.e., κ = 0), network competition
achieves efficiency. However, in this case, access price disappears from the profit function
and the profit function becomes the same as the one in a standard Hotelling model without
interconnection. This is why they rediscover the efficient two-part tariff result obtained by
Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002) in the context of competitive
price discrimination without interconnection. In other words, in Dessein (2003) and Hahn
(2004), efficiency is achieved by making the case with interconnection similar to the case
without interconnection. What we show is that in the presence of interconnection, there is
a class of access pricing rules which achieve efficiency; interconnection provides additional
instruments to achieve efficiency with respect to no interconnection.
Section 2 presents the general model, defines the set of linear access pricing rules and
characterizes the Ramsey outcome. Section 3 considers competition in linear prices: it first
establishes the main result, compares different access pricing rules and discusses the robust-
ness of the result to relaxing the full coverage assumption. Section 4 considers how the rule
can be adapted in a context where firms compete in non-linear prices by benchmarking the
access price to the average retail price. Section 4.1 shows that a whole class of benchmarking
rules lead to marginal cost pricing. Section 4.2 studies how the regulator (or the compe-
tition authority) can achieve additional goal(s) such as optimal investment by adequately
choosing among these rules and also shows that the marginal cost pricing result of section
4.1 holds even when we consider heterogeneous consumers or asymmetric networks. Section
5 concludes. All the proofs except that of Proposition 2 are gathered in the Appendix.
2 Framework
2.1 The model
We present a general model of n-network competition which includes the duopoly model of
LRT (1998a) as a special case. There is a mass one of consumers.
• Individual demand :
Let u(q) be the utility that a consumer derives from placing q volume of calls. The utility
function u(·) is twice continuously differentiable, with u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, which implies that
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demand function is differentiable. Let q(·) denote the demand function, given by u′(q(p)) = p
where p is the variable retail price. When network charges pi, the volume of calls placed by
a customer of network i is given by q(pi). Let v(p) be the indirect utility function, i.e.,
v(p) = max
q
{u(q)− pq}.
Let R(p) ≡ (p − c)q(p) represent the revenue per consumer. We assume that R(p) has a
unique maximum at p = pm, is strictly increasing when p < pm and strictly decreasing when
p > pm. Therefore, pm denotes the monopoly price. Let Rm denote the monopoly revenue
per consumer (i.e., Rm = R(pm)). We assume limp→∞R(p) = 0.
• Firm’s demand (or market share):
The networks (i.e., firms) provide horizontally differentiated services and each network
can cover all the consumers. Consider first competition in two-part tariffs: firm i chooses
tariff Ti = Fi + piq. Given (pi, Fi), the net surplus of a consumer of network i is given by:
wi = v(pi)− Fi.
Let w ≡ (w1, ...wn) and w−i ≡ (w1, .., wi−1, wi+1, ..., wn). Let αi(wi;w−i) denote the mea-
sure of consumers subscribing to network i. We assume that αi(w) satisfies the following
properties:
Property 1 (symmetry): For any vector w with wi = wj for some i and j, we have
αi(w) = αj(w).
Property 2 (monotonicity): For any i, j = 1, ..., n and i 6= j, αi(wi;w−i) is differ-
entiable with respect to each wj and increases with wi and decreases with wj; it strictly
increases with wi and strictly decreases with wj for αi ∈ (0, 1).11
Property 3 (full coverage):
∑n
i=1 αi(wi;w−i) = 1 for all relevant w ∈ <n+.
Properties 1, 2, and 3 are satisfied by the Hotelling model of LRT (1998a) and the
circular city model with n = 2 or 3 (Salop, 1979). For n > 3, our model is more natural
than the circular city model since in the latter, a (minor) price change of network i affects
11Property 2 can be more rigorously defined as follows. Given w−i, let wi be the minimum wi making
αi(wi;w−i) = 1 and let wi be the maximum wi ∈ <+ making αi(wi;w−i) = 0. Then, αi strictly increases
with wi for wi ∈ [wi, wi]. Similarly, given w−j with j 6= i, let wj be the minimum wj ∈ <+ making
αi(wi;w−i) = 0 and let wj be the maximum wj ∈ <+ making αi(wi;w−i) = 1. Then, αi strictly decreases
with wj for wj ∈
[
wj , wj
]
.
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only the demands of its direct neighbors (network i − 1 and network i + 1) but does not
affect the demands of other networks. In the context of telecommunication markets all
networks compete directly with each other for all customers, and not only with two artificial
”neighbors” for a specific subset of consumers. The symmetry and the full coverage imply
αi =
1
n
for all i = 1, ..., n if wi = w for all i = 1, ..., n. Regarding the full coverage property,
LRT (1998a) assume that each consumer derives, in addition to u(q), a constant utility v0
from subscribing to one of the networks, which is large enough to ensure that all consumers
always choose to join one of the networks. Since the total mass of consumers is equal to
one, under full coverage, the mass of consumers subscribing to network i (i.e., αi) is equal
to network i’s market share.
In the case of competition in linear prices, let p ≡ (p1, ..., pn) ∈ <n+ represent the vector
of retail prices and let p−i ≡ (p1, .., pi−1, pi+1, ..., pn). Since wi strictly decreases with pi, it
is more convenient to work with αi(pi;p−i) than with αi(wi;w−i). Obviously, properties 1-3
imply that similar properties hold for αi(pi;p−i). Of course, αi(pi;p−i) decreases with pi
and increases with pj.
• Cost :
Concerning the cost side, we use the same technology that is used in LRT (1998a).
Serving a customer involves a fixed cost f > 0, say of connecting the customer’s home to
the network and of billing and serving her. We assume Rm > f . A network also incurs a
marginal cost c0 per call at the originating and terminating ends of the call and marginal
cost c1 in between. Therefore, the total marginal cost of a call is
c ≡ 2c0 + c1.
2.2 Access pricing rules
We consider simple access pricing rules which are not informationally demanding. More
precisely, the informational constraint that the regulator faces is defined as follows.
• The regulator’s informational constraint :
On the one hand, we assume that the regulator (or the competition authority) has limited
information about the market such that she is not informed about the individual demand
function q(p), each firm’s demand function and the value of the fixed cost f . On the other
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hand, she knows the marginal cost c and the termination cost c0. Furthermore, she and con-
sumers observe retail prices (p1, ..., pn) or [(p1, F1), ..., (pn, Fn)]. Moreover, when we consider
competition in two-part tariffs, we need to assume that the regulator can observe average
retail prices,12 which means that she must be able to observe realized demand.
The firms are assumed to know all the relevant information regarding both the demand
and the cost sides.
• The linear access pricing rules :
Let aij with i 6= j denote the access charge that network i pays to network j. Consider
competition in linear prices. In order to consider simple rules, we limit our attention to the
following linear access pricing rules:
aij − c0 = h(pi, pj, c) = h1pi + h2pj + h3c+ h4 for any i, j = 1, ..., n and i 6= j, (1)
where (h1, h2, h3, h4) ∈ <4 is a vector of constants. Note that we consider a reciprocal access
pricing rule since the coefficients (h1, h2, h3, h4) do not depend on firms’ identities. This is
without loss of generality given that we consider symmetric networks.13 Let ΛLn be the set of
linear access pricing rules satisfying the above form (1). Some special cases of linear access
pricing rules are:
• Cost based access pricing rule: aij = c0.
• Efficient component pricing rule (ECPR): aij − c0 = pj − c.
• Generalized efficient component pricing rule (GECPR): aij − c0 = pi − c.
• Bill and keep: aij = 0.
In the case of the ECPR, the access price that network i pays to network j is the sum
of the termination cost and network j’s retail price mark-up. In contrast, in the case of the
GECPR, the access price that network i pays to network j is the sum of the termination
cost and network i’s retail price mark-up (Sibley et al. 2004, Mialon 2007).
12For instance, the Spanish telecommunication agency (Comisio´n del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones)
publishes data on each network’s average price.
13In the case of asymmetric networks, we need to consider non-reciprocal rules such that the coefficients
depend on the firms’ identities.
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2.3 Ramsey benchmark
For future reference, we derive the social optimum in the ideal case in which the regulator
knows all the relevant information and can dictate the prices under the constraint that the
industry breaks even. Under linear pricing, consumer variable welfare is
W (p) =
n∑
i=1
αi(p)v(pi)− T [α1(p), ..., αn(p)] (2)
where T (α1, ..., αn) denotes the average consumer’s utility from not being able to consume
her preferred service. We assume that T (α) is minimized at equal market share αi =
1
n
.
The industry budget constraint is
n∑
i=1
αi(p)R(pi) = f. (3)
Maximizing (2) subject to (3) yields a symmetric solution, pi = p
R for all i = 1, ..., n,
where the Ramsey price pR is the lowest price that satisfies the budget constraint:
R(pR) = f.
Since we assume Rm > f , we have pR < pm. Let q(pR) ≡ qR.
Clearly, in the case of competition in two-part tariffs, it is socially optimal to set a two-
part tariff with variable price c and fixed fee F ≥ f . T (α) is minimized at equal market
share αi =
1
n
.
2.4 Timing
The timing of the game we consider is the following:
1. The regulator chooses a linear access pricing rule in ΛLn .
2. All networks simultaneously choose retail prices.
3. Consumers make subscription and consumption decisions.
3 Linear Pricing
In this section, we consider competition in linear prices. We introduce two more properties.
Property 4 is about the degree of substitutability among the networks. Because of our
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assumptions on R(p), there exists a p > pm such that R(p) = f . We assume in this section:
Property 4 (substitutability): αi(p) = 0 if pi ≥ p¯ and pj = pm for some j 6= i.
The property says that a firm charging a high price yielding negative revenue per customer
will have no market share if there is at least one competitor charging no more than the
monopoly price. Hence the property guarantees that there is at least some mild level of
substitutability. The assumption will be used to exclude the possibility of an equilibrium
in which some firm charges such a high price. The only reason such a firm could survive
is because of the revenue from access prices charged to its competitors. However, such a
situation seems unstable in practice as the competitors could drive this firm out of business
by lowering their prices.
Property 5 is a technical assumption to eliminate asymmetric equilibria for n ≥ 3:
Property 5 (proportional market share increases): Let i, j and k be three different
firms and consider price vectors p and pˆ with pk < pˆk and pm = pˆm for all m 6= k. If
αj(p) > 0, then αi(pˆ)/αj(pˆ) = αi(p)/αj(p).
Property 5 says that the ratio of market shares of any two firms is not affected by a
price increase by a third firm. It is automatically satisfied when n = 2 and is introduced
to exclude asymmetric equilibria when n ≥ 3. Together with the full coverage property this
property means that all clients lost by the third firm will go to the competitors and each
competitor’s market share will increase by the same percentage.
3.1 The main result
We can now state the main result for the case of competition in linear prices.
Proposition 1 For any demand structure satisfying Properties 1-5 and for n ≥ 2, there is
a unique linear access pricing rule in ΛLn defined by aij − c0 = nn−1(pi − c) that implements,
independently of the underlying demand conditions, the Ramsey outcome (pi = p
R for all
i = 1, ..., n) as the unique equilibrium, which is symmetric.
Note first the remarkable result that the optimal rule implementing the Ramsey outcome
does not depend on the demand structure as long as it satisfies Properties 1-5. In what
follows, we prove that the Ramsey outcome is the unique symmetric equilibrium and provide
the intuition. The proof that no asymmetric equilibrium exists is provided in the Appendix.
In section 3.2 we compare different access pricing rules in an intuitive way and provide
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a numerical example. In section 3.3, we discuss the robustness of our rule when some
assumptions are relaxed.
3.1.1 Uniqueness of the candidate rule to achieve the Ramsey outcome
Given a linear access pricing rule belonging to ΛLn and under the assumption of balanced
calling patterns14, the profit of network i is given by:
Πi(pi : p−i) = αi {(pi − c)q(pi)− f}+
∑
j 6=i
αiαj {h(pj, pi, c)q(pj)− h(pi, pj, c)q(pi)} , (4)
where the first term represents the retail profit and the second term represents the net access
revenue (or deficit).
We show that among all the access pricing rules belonging to ΛLn , there is a unique
candidate rule that satisfies a necessary condition to implement the Ramsey outcome (pi =
pR for i = 1, ..., n). From (4), the first-order derivative of Πi with respect to pi is given by:
∂Πi
∂pi
=
∂αi
∂pi
{(pi − c)q(pi)− f}+ αi
{
q(pi) + (pi − c)dq(pi)
dpi
}
(5)
+
∑
j 6=i
[
∂αi
∂pi
αj +
∂αj
∂pi
αi
]
{h(pj, pi, c)q(pj)− h(pi, pj, c)q(pi)}
+αi
∑
j 6=i
αj
{
h2q(pj)− h1q(pi)− h(pi, pj, c)dq(pi)
dpi
}
.
As Πi is a differentiable function of pi, a necessary condition to implement the Ramsey
outcome is that the first-order derivative is zero at pi = p
R when all the other networks
charge pj = p
R for j 6= i. We have R(pR) = f and h(pj, pi, c)q(pj) = h(pi, pj, c)q(pi) at
the symmetric equilibrium candidate with the Ramsey price, implying that the first and the
third terms are zero in the above first-order derivative. Since q(pi) = q
R and αi =
1
n
for
i = 1, ..., n at the symmetric equilibrium candidate, the necessary condition holds only if the
following conditions are satisfied by h(pi, pj, c):
1 +
n− 1
n
(h2 − h1) = 0
pR − c− n− 1
n
[
(h1 + h2) p
R + h3c+ h4
]
= 0.
14The assumption is from LRT (1998a, b) and standard in the literature. It means that a consumer has
an equal chance of calling a given consumer belonging to his network and another given consumer belonging
to any other rival network.
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Given the regulator’s informational constraint introduced in section 2.2, we find from the
two conditions that h1 =
n
n−1 , h2 = 0, h3c + h4 = − nn−1c. Therefore, we obtain the unique
candidate in the set of linear access pricing rules as follows:
aij − c0 = n
n− 1(pi − c). (6)
3.1.2 Existence of a symmetric equilibrium
We now show that under the access pricing rule aij − c0 = nn−1(pi − c), the symmetric
equilibrium with pi = p
R for i = 1, ..., n always exists. Given the access pricing rule (6),
network i’s profit is given by:
Πi(pi : p−i) = αi [R(pi)− f ] + n
n− 1αi
∑
j 6=i
αj [R(pj)−R(pi)] (7)
Suppose that all the other networks except network 1 charge pR. Then, because of the
symmetry and the full coverage, we have α2 = ... = αn =
1−α1
n−1 and network 1’s profit is
given by;
Π1(p1 : p
R, ..., pR) = α1 [R(p1)− f ] + n
n− 1α1(1− α1) [f −R(pi)]
=
nα1
n− 1
(
α1 − 1
n
)
[R(p1)− f ] .
Note first that Π1 = 0 when p1 = p
R and Π1 = 0 for p1 ≥ p under Property 4. Consider any
p1 with p1 < p
R. Then, we have α1 >
1
n
and R(p1) < f , implying Π1 < 0. Consider now
p1 ∈
(
pR, p
)
. Then, we have α1 <
1
n
and R(p1) > f , implying Π1 < 0 if α1 > 0. Therefore,
the symmetric equilibrium always exists.
To give the intuition, we consider the case of n = 2 and examine network 1’s price choice
given p2 = p
R. Consider first p1 ∈
(
pR, p
)
. In this case, network 1’s retail profit per customer
is R(p1) − f > 0. Its access revenue per customer is 2(1 − α1)R(p2) = 2(1 − α1)f while its
access payment per customer is 2(1− α1)R(p1), implying that it has a net access deficit per
customer equal to 2(1 − α1) [f −R(p1)]. Since α1 < 12 for p1 ∈
(
pR, p
)
, the access deficit is
larger than the retail profit and therefore the firm makes a loss. In contrast, in the case of
p1 < p
R, the firm has a retail deficit per customer equal to R(p1)− f < 0 while it has a net
access profit per customer equal to 2(1 − α1) [f −R(p1)]. Since α1 > 12 , the access profit is
not large enough to cover the retail deficit and the firm’s profit is still negative. In other
words, the coefficient in the optimal linear access pricing rule (2 when n = 2) is such that (i)
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when p1 = p
R, network 1’s profit is zero, (ii) when p1 ∈
(
pR, p
)
, its retail profit per customer
is smaller than its net access deficit per customer, implying that it makes a loss (iii) when
p1 < p
R, its retail deficit per customer is larger than its net access revenue per customer,
still implying that it makes a loss.
Note that in LRT (1998a), the non-existence of equilibrium occurs since a network can
have an incentive to corner the market by deviating to a price lower than the price in the
equilibrium candidate. In our equilibrium achieving the Ramsey outcome, the cornering
strategy is not profitable since it requires the deviating network to charge a price lower than
pR, implying that the firm makes a loss after cornering the market.
3.1.3 Non-existence of other symmetric equilibria
We now show that under the access pricing rule aij − c0 = nn−1(pi − c), no other symmetric
equilibrium exists except pi = p
R for i = 1, ..., n. Let p be a symmetric equilibrium candidate.
First, it is obvious that neither p < pR nor p > p can be an equilibrium since then each
firm makes a negative profit. Therefore, we consider only p ∈ (pR, p]. Consider first p = p.
Then, each firm gets zero profit. Suppose now that network 1 deviates to p1 = p
m while all
the other networks continue to charge p. Then, network 1’s profit is given by:
Π1(p
m; p, ..., p) =
nα1
n− 1
(
α1 − 1
n
)
[Rm − f ] > 0,
where α1 = α1(p
m; p, ..., p) > 1
n
. Therefore, no symmetric equilibrium with p = p exists.
Let us consider now p ∈ (pR, p). Then, from (7), the first-order derivative of Πi with
respect to pi is given by:
∂Πi(pi : p−i)
∂pi
= [R(pi)− f ] ∂αi
∂pi
+ αi
dR(pi)
dpi
− n
n− 1αi
∑
j 6=i
αj
dR(pi)
dpi
(8)
+
n
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
[
αj
∂αi
∂pi
+ αi
∂αj
∂pi
]
[R(pj)−R(pi)] .
At pi = p for i = 1, ..., n, since
∑
j 6=i αj =
n−1
n
, the first-order derivative is given by:
∂Πi(p : p, ..., p)
∂pi
= [R(p)− f ] ∂αi
∂pi
< 0 for p ∈ (pR, p) . (9)
Therefore, each firm has an incentive to undercut and no other symmetric equilibrium exists.
The access price rule aij − c0 = nn−1(pi − c) intensifies retail price competition since by
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reducing pi network i can reduce the access price that it should pay to the rival networks.
In particular, at any symmetric price p that allows networks to realize a positive retail profit
(i.e., R(p) > f), each network has an incentive to choose a price lower than p. From (8),
when network i reduces its retail price, there are three effects on its profit. First, given its
retail price, its retail profit increases through its expansion of market share. Second, given
each network’s market share, both its retail revenue per consumer and its access payment per
consumer decrease. Third, given each network’s retail price, the changes in the market shares
affect its net access payment. In any symmetric equilibrium candidate with pi = p ∈
(
pR, p
)
for i = 1, ..., n, the second and the third effects are zero and the first is positive. Therefore,
each firm has an incentive to deviate in order to increase its market share.
3.2 Comparison with other rules when n = 2
Suppose that the regulator should choose an access pricing rule without knowing the demand
structure while she only knows the marginal cost structure (c, c0). Consider duopolistic
competition15 and, for simplicity, let ai denote the access charge that network i pays to the
rival network. Then, from Proposition 1(ii), we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Under Properties 1-5, the social welfare is strictly higher under the access
pricing rule ai − c0 = 2(pi − c) than under any other fixed access price (including ai = c0),
under the ECPR (ai − c0 = pj − c, for i 6= j) and under the GECPR (ai − c0 = pi − c).
In order to give the intuition, we examine the first order derivative of network i’s profit
in each access pricing rule assuming that a symmetric equilibrium with p1 = p2 = p < p
m
exists under each rule.
First, under a fixed and reciprocal access price rule a1 = a2 = a, network i’s profit is
given by:
Πi(pi; pj) = αi [R(pi)− f ] + αi(1− αi)(a− c0) [q(pj)− q (pi)] .
Therefore, the first-order derivative with respect to pi at pi = pj = p is given by:
[R(p)− f ] dαi
dpi
+
1
2
dRi
dpi
− (a− c0)
4
dq(pi)
dpi
. (10)
Consider first the case of the marginal cost pricing (a = c0). In this case, for any market
share, each network has zero net access profit. Since dαi
dpi
< 0 < dRi
dpi
, the first order condition
15The intuition obtained in this section applies to the case of n > 2 as well.
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holds only for p > pR such that R(p) > f . Hence, the marginal cost pricing cannot achieve
the Ramsey outcome. From (10), it is clear that as the access price becomes larger than the
termination cost, network i has an extra incentive to raise pi since by reducing the demand
of its own customers, it can reduce its access payment. Since an increase in the reciprocal
access price results in an increase in the retail price, LRT (1998a) find that networks can
achieve the monopoly outcome if they can choose access price through private negotiation.
In contrast, as the access price becomes smaller than the termination cost, network i has an
extra incentive to reduce pi in order to increase its access revenue. This is why LRT (1998a)
find that the Ramsey access charge requires an access charge lower than the termination
cost. More precisely, they find that Ramsey access charge, denoted by aR, is given by:
aR − c0
2
= −(1− 1
η
)(pm − pR),
where η is the elasticity of demand and is assumed to be constant and larger than 1. Note
that in order to be able to compute the Ramsey access price, the regulator should have
precise knowledge about the demand structure such that she should be able to compute η,
pm and pR. Furthermore, LRT (1998a) show that the equilibrium does not exist for a 6= c0
if the degree of substitutability of the two networks is high enough.
Second, in the case of the ECPR, network i’s profit is given by:
Πi(pi; pj) = αi [R(pi)− f ] + αi(1− αi) [q(pj)(pi − c)− q (pi) (pj − c)] .
Therefore, the first-order derivative with respect to pi at pi = pj = p is given by:
[R(p)− f ] dαi
dpi
+
1
2
dRi
dpi
+
1
4
[
q(p)− (p− c)dq(pi)
dpi
]
. (11)
The first two terms in (11) are what we found in the first-order derivative under a = c0 and
have to do with the retail profit. The last term in (11) has to do with the access revenue
and since p > c and dq(pi)
dpi
< 0, it induces network i to increase its retail price. Since under
the ECPR a network can increase its access revenue by increasing its retail price, the ECPR
induces each network to choose a price higher than the one under a = c0.
Last, consider the following rule ai − c0 = κ(pi − c) where κ(≥ 0) is a constant. For
instance, if κ = 1, we have the GECPR and if κ = 0, we have the marginal cost access
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pricing. Then, network i’s profit is given by:
Πi(pi : pj) = αi [R(pi)− f ] + καi(1− αi) [R(pj)−R(pi)] .
Therefore, the first-order derivative with respect to pi at pi = pj = p is given by:
[R(p)− f ] dαi
dpi
+
1
2
dRi
dpi
− κ
4
dRi
dpi
. (12)
The first two terms in (12) are what we found in the first-order derivative under a = c0 and
have to do with the retail profit. The last term in (12) has to do with the access revenue
and, since dRi
dpi
> 0, an increase in κ induces network i to reduce its retail price. This implies
that the retail price under the marginal cost pricing is higher than the retail price under the
GECPR, which is higher than the retail price under when κ = 2 (i.e., the Ramsey price).
Note that from (12), when κ = 2, the only price satisfying the first-order condition is the
Ramsey price.
Table 1 summarizes the quantitative effects of the different access pricing rules for a
numerical example employing the duopoly Hotelling model with consumers having demand
function with constant elasticity. For this table we used the following parameters: η = 1.5,
c0 = 0.05, c = 0.12, f = 0, σ = 0.001 and utility function u(q) = 300q
1/3. In this case
monopoly price would equal pm = 0.36. Consumer surplus (CS) is defined as the indirect
utility v(p∗). Note that no equilibrium exists in this case of the ECPR rule.
retail price profit/firm CS TS
Bill and Keep 0.21 46.36 438.64 485.00
Cost-based 0.25 52.32 397.01 449.33
ECPR na na na na
GECPR 0.21 46.19 439.58 485.77
Ramsey 0.12 0.00 577.35 577.35
Table 1: Numerical results for different access pricing rules with constant elasticity demand.
Table 2 summarizes the quantitative effects of the different access pricing rules for a
numerical example employing the duopoly Hotelling model with consumers having linear
demand. For this table we used the following parameters (also employed by Carter and
Wright (1999)): c0 = 0, c = 1, f = 0, σ = 0.01 and demand function q(p) = 10 − p. In
this case monopoly price would equal pm = 5.5. Again, consumer surplus (CS) is defined as
the indirect utility v(p∗). Note that Bill and Keep and cost-based regulation yield the same
results since a = c0 = 0.
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retail price profit/firm CS TS
Bill and Keep 4.44 9.56 15.48 25.03
Cost-based 4.44 9.56 15.48 25.03
ECPR 5.35 10.11 10.83 20.94
GECPR 3.41 7.94 21.73 29.67
Ramsey 1.00 0.00 40.50 40.50
Table 2: Numerical results for different access pricing rules with linear demand.
3.3 Robustness: relaxing full coverage
In this part, we discuss the robustness of our results to relaxing the full coverage assumption.
Hence, we here assume that
∑n
i=1 αi(p : p, ..., p) strictly decreases with p. We continue to
normalize the mass of potential consumers at one. Since
∑n
i=1 αi(p : p, ..., p) represents the
total mass of consumers who subscribe to one of the networks, it cannot be larger than one.
In this setting, the Ramsey price is still characterized by R(pR) = f . Let αi(p
R : pR, ..., pR) =
αR > 0. Then, we have the following result:
Proposition 2 Suppose that
∑n
i=1 αi(p : p, ..., p) strictly decreases with p. For any demand
structure satisfying Properties 1, 2, 4,
(i) there is a unique linear access pricing rule in ΛLn defined by aij− c0 = 1αR(n−1)(pi− c) that
satisfies a necessary condition to achieve the Ramsey outcome (pi = p
R for i = 1, ..., n) as
an equilibrium
(ii) under the rule, pi = p
R for i = 1, ..., n is an equilibrium.
Note that the access pricing rule in Proposition 2 generalizes the one in Proposition 1
since under the full coverage, αR = 1
n
.
Proof. (i) The first-order derivative of Πi with respect to pi is given by (5). A necessary
condition to implement the Ramsey outcome is that the first-order derivative is zero at
pi = p
R for i = 1, ..., n. Since R(pR) = f and h(pj, pi, c)q(pj) = h(pi, pj, c)q(pi) at the
symmetric equilibrium candidate, the first and the third terms are zero in (5) at pi = p
R
for i = 1, ..., n. Since q(pi) = q
R and αi = α
R for i = 1, ..., n at the symmetric equilibrium
candidate, the necessary condition holds only if the following conditions are satisfied by
h(pi, pj, c):
1 + (n− 1)αR (h2 − h1) = 0
pR − c− (n− 1)αR [(h1 + h2) pR + h3c+ h4] = 0.
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From the two conditions, we find that h1 =
1
αR(n−1) , h2 = 0, h3c+ h4 = − cαR(n−1) . Therefore,
we obtain the unique candidate in the set of linear access pricing rules as follows:
aij − c0 = 1
αR(n− 1)(pi − c).
(ii) Given the access pricing rule, network i’s profit is given by:
Πi(pi : pj) = αi [R(pi)− f ] + 1
αR(n− 1)αi
∑
j 6=i
αj [R(pj)−R(pi)]
Suppose that all the other networks except network 1 charge pR. Then, because of the
symmetry, we have α2 = ... = αn and network 1’s profit is given by;
Π1(p1; p
R, ..., pR) = α1 [R(p1)− f ] + 1
αR
α1α2 [f −R(p1)]
= α1
[
αR − α2
]
αR
[R(p1)− f ] ,
where α2 = α2(p
R; p1, p
R, ..., pR). Note first that Π1 = 0 when p1 = p
R and Π1 = 0 for
p1 ≥ p under Property 4. Consider any p1 with p1 < pR. Then, from the monotonicity, we
have αR > α2 and R(p1) < f , implying Π1 < 0. Consider now p1 ∈
(
pR, p
)
. Then, we have
αR < α2 and R(p1) > f , implying Π1 < 0 if α1 > 0.
Remark 1: Even though we relax the full coverage assumption, the rule presented in
Proposition 1 implements the Ramsey outcome if the market is mature in that the total mass
of consumers choosing to join one among the networks is equal to one at the Ramsey price.
Otherwise, the regulator needs to know αR and in this sense the optimal access pricing rule is
informationally demanding. However, even when it is difficult for the regulator to know αR,
this does not imply that she should adopt one of the alternative access pricing rules presented
in Section 2.2. As the comparison of different rules in Section 3.2 has shown, the intuition
that one can intensify the retail competition by making the access price that network i
pays to other networks increase with its retail price holds generally. More precisely, since
αR ≤ 1/n holds, we have 1
αR(n−1) ≥ n/(n− 1). Therefore, one can use the access pricing rule
presented in Proposition 1, aij − c0 = nn−1(pi − c): although the equilibrium price under the
rule is higher than the Ramsey price, it is lower than the equilibrium price under any fixed
access price (larger than the termination cost), or under the ECPR or under the GECPR.
Furthermore, the previous rule is not informationally demanding.
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4 Two-part tariffs
Although linear prices are used in practice, especially for pre-paid cards in the mobile
telecommunication market, non-linear prices are also heavily used. Moreover, the litera-
ture has embraced two-part tariff competition as the standard. In this section we study
competition in two-part tariffs when our rule is adapted to make access charges depend (lin-
early) on average retail prices. After showing in section 4.1 that the class of rules we consider
induces networks to choose the marginal cost pricing in a general setting, we investigate in
section 4.2 other properties of our rules in a duopoly model a` la LRT (1998a).
It is clear that firms would prefer to use two-part tariffs rather than linear prices. Namely,
when firms are allowed to use a two-part tariff, they will in general find it optimal to set a
strictly positive fixed fee to extract consumer surplus. If one would naively use the access
pricing rule that is optimal in the case of linear prices (i.e., aij = c0+2(pi− c)) when firm i
uses tariff Ti = Fi + piq, no symmetric equilibrium would exist.
16 Therefore, the rule needs
to be adapted to give sensible and satisfactory results. Inspired by the previous discussion,
we propose to make the access charge paid by firm i depend linearly on its average retail
price as follows:
ai = c0 + κ
(
Fi + piq(pi)
q(pi)
− c
)
, (13)
where ai represents the access charge that firm i pays to each rival firm. Since it only depends
on firm i’s retail prices, we use ai instead of aij for simplicity.
4.1 A main result: marginal cost pricing
Under the standard full coverage assumption, we find, as a main result, that firms always
will set variable price equal to marginal cost c, independently of κ and their market shares,
for all κ ≤ 1. In what follows, we first explain intuitively why the class of access pricing
rules we consider generates the marginal cost pricing.
Given (pi, Fi), the net surplus of a consumer of network i is given by:
wi = v(pi)− Fi.
16More precisely, firms would have incentives to reduce variable price below cost (for example, to zero if
negative prices are not allowed) so that access charge becomes negative. Each network would then receive
money from its rival for each off-net call made by its subscribers. This then leads the firms to compete for
market share by reducing fixed fees resulting in huge losses.
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Let w ≡ (w1, ...wn). The market share of network i is given by αi(w). For instance, in the
Hotelling model of duopoly (LRT, 1998a,b), we have
αi =
1
2
+ σ(wi − wj),
where σ ≡ 1/(2t) and t is the transportation cost in the Hotelling model. We first consider
the case of κ = 0 which corresponds to ai = c0. Then, network i’s profit is given by:
Πi(pi, Fi) = αi [(pi − c)q(pi) + Fi − f ] = αipii − αif.
where pii ≡ (pi − c)q(pi) + Fi represents network i’s retail profit per customer gross of the
fixed cost f when κ = 0. It is useful to think that network i chooses (pi, wi) instead of
(pi, Fi). Then, we have:
Πi(pi, wi) = αi [(pi − c)q(pi) + v(pi)− wi − f ]
= αi [u(q(pi))− cq(pi)− wi − f ] .
Given wi (hence, given αi), maximizing Πi with respect to pi is equivalent to maximizing
total surplus, which leads to the marginal cost pricing (i.e., pi = c) for any αi as LRT (1998a)
show.
Consider now κ 6= 0. Then, we have the following expression for network i’s profit:
Πi(pi, Fi) = αi {[(pi − c− (1− αi)(ai − c0)] q(pi) + Fi − f + Σj 6=iαj(aj − c0)q(pj)} .
In particular, from (13) the total access payment (net of the total termination cost) that
network i makes to network j is given by:
αi(1− αi)(ai − c0)q(pi) = αi(1− αi)κpii.
The above equation shows that network i’s access payment (net of the termination cost)
per customer is a fraction (1− αi)κ of its retail profit per customer pii. Inserting the above
expression into the profit function leads to
Πi(pi, Fi) = αi [(1− κ(1− αi))pii − f + κΣj 6=iαjpij] , (14)
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which is equivalent to
Πi(pi, wi) = αi [(1− κ(1− αi))(R(pi) + v(pi)− wi)]− αif + αiκΣj 6=iαjpij (15)
Therefore, as long as (1 − κ(1 − αi)) ≥ 0 (which is satisfied when κ ≤ 1), the profit
maximization with respect to pi for given wi leads to the marginal cost pricing (i.e., pi = c)
for any αi and for any κ ≤ 1. The intuition is clear from (15). Given wi (hence, given αi),
when we maximize Πi with respect to pi, only the first term matters in (15) and therefore
maximizing Πi is equivalent to maximizing the profit per customer pii as is the case when
κ = 0. This is because, under our access pricing rule, network i’s access payment net of
termination charge per customer is just a fraction of its retail profit per customer.
The above intuition suggests that our access pricing rule gives the marginal cost pricing
under various circumstances; as long as ai = c0 generates the marginal cost pricing, our
access pricing rule generates the marginal cost pricing as well. In fact, we show this later
on when firms can invest to improve quality of their networks or when firms compete by
providing a menu of two-part tariffs to heterogeneous customers.
The following proposition presents our main result:
Proposition 3 Assume Properties 1-3. (i) For any n ≥ 2 and κ ≤ 1, all networks choose
the same variable price p = c.
(ii) More specifically, in the case of the Hotelling duopoly model (LRT, 1998a,b), when
κ ≤ 1 and for small enough σ > 0, there exists a unique equilibrium, which is symmetric.
In the equilibrium, networks charge variable price p = c and fixed fee F = f + (2− κ)/(4σ).
Equilibrium profits per firm equal (2− κ)/(8σ).
Hence, for any κ ≤ 1 we obtain efficient pricing. By varying κ we can address and achieve
further objectives, without distorting the efficient marginal cost pricing result. Furthermore,
proposition 3(ii) shows that the profit is not neutral and decreases with κ. An increase in κ
promotes competition in terms of the fixed fee and thereby decreases the profit. Therefore,
by increasing κ, the regulator or competition authority can improve consumer welfare at the
expense of firms’ profits.
However, we cannot push firms’ profits all the way to zero. Namely, this would require
firms to set the competitive schedule T = f + cq, which in turn requires setting κ = 2. But
this cannot be an equilibrium since the average price at this equilibrium is strictly above c,
so that access charge is above marginal cost. Then, a network could deviate by offering a
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schedule T˜ = F˜ + p˜q, where 0 < p˜ < c and F˜ = −(p˜− c)q(p˜), such that its average price is
exactly equal to marginal cost c and such that its market share α˜i is positive but less than
one half. The deviating firm then pays an access fee equal to termination cost c0 so that
both on-net and off-net calls are at marginal cost c, which in turn equals average price. It
thus would earn zero net profits from calls made by her own subscribers but would then
make strictly positive profits because the net access revenue exceeds the incurred fixed costs:
2(1− α˜i)α˜if > α˜if .
4.2 Extensions
In this subsection, we consider the Hotelling model a` la LRT (1998a).
4.2.1 Expanding coverage
In this subsection we take the participation condition of consumers seriously. In the previous
section, and in most of the related literature, one typically assumes that σ is small enough,
which implies that transportation cost t is very large. This would lead consumers in the
center of the Hotelling model to forego subscribing to a network. In order to maintain the
full coverage assumption one needs to assume that consumers have a high enough valuation
for being subscribed to the network, even if no one else subscribes or when hardly any calls
are made (typically, v0, introduced in section 2, is assumed to be large enough). A reason
for this could be that then one can call 911 in emergencies. In this subsection, we relax
this assumption and assume that v0 is not large and smaller than f . Hence, the number of
subscribers in equilibrium will depend on the net surplus consumers obtain, which in turn
depends on the degree of competition between two networks.
Assume that consumers’ valuation from subscribing to a network when in total ρ con-
sumers are subscribing to one of the networks is such that a consumer at distance x from
his network that charges T = F + pq, receives utility v0 + ρv(p)− F − xt.
Let us denote
λ =
v0 + v(c)− f
t
.
When total coverage by two networks charging T = f + cq equals 2α ≤ 1, social welfare
equals
W (α) = 2α(v0 + 2αv(c)− f − tα/2).
W ′(α) = 2(α(4v(c)− t) + v0 − f) and W ′′(α) = 2(4v(c)− t). If t ≥ 4v(c), W ′(α) < 0 for all
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positive α and consumer welfare is maximized at α = 0. If t < 4v(c), W (α) is convex and
maximized at zero or 1/2. Since W (0) = 0 and W (1/2) = v0 + v(c)− f − t/4, we find that
the full coverage is optimal when λ > 1/4 and that no coverage is optimal when λ ≤ 1/4.
However, also note that when networks charge the very competitive schedule T = f + cq,
the consumer in the middle only receives positive net surplus if v0 + v(c) − f − t/2 > 0.
Hence, implementing the consumer surplus maximizing network prices when λ ∈ (1/4, 1/2)
is incompatible with voluntary participation. We will henceforth assume that λ > 1/2 so
that full coverage is both feasible and desirable.
We now consider the necessary condition for a full coverage equilibrium to exist. Recall
from Proposition 3 that equilibrium prices are T = f + t− κt/2 + cq. To have full coverage
and voluntary participation in such an equilibrium, one needs the consumer in the center of
the interval to be willing to subscribe when anticipating that everyone will subscribe to one
of the networks. This condition reads v0 + v(c)− t/2− (f + t− κt/2) > 0, or equivalently,
λ =
v0 + v(c)− f
t
>
3− κ
2
.
In particular, for κ = 0 there is no equilibrium in which the market is fully covered when
(v0+v(c)−f)/t < 3/2. By increasing κ one relaxes the full coverage constraint. In particular,
as long as λ ∈ (1, 3/2), no full coverage equilibrium exists when subscription is voluntary
and cost based access price regulation (κ = 0) is applied. However, when using our rule with
κ = 1, existence of the full coverage equilibrium is restored when consumers anticipate that
the market will be covered. An increase in κ intensifies competition between the networks
and thereby make them leave a larger surplus to consumers, which make the full coverage
more likely. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 4 In the Hotelling model of LRT (1998a), assume v0 < f . Then, an increase
in κ makes full coverage more likely. For λ ∈ (1, 2/3) where λ ≡ [v0 + v(c)− f ] /t, no full
coverage equilibrium exists under the cost based access price regulation ( i.e., when κ = 0)
but existence of the full coverage equilibrium is restored when κ = 1.
4.2.2 Investment
Valletti and Cambini (2005) analyze the effects of fixed access fees on firms’ incentives to
invest in the quality of their network. They find that even if access charge is fixed at marginal
cost of termination, quality decisions are strategic substitutes, and firms underinvest in
quality. Moreover, they show that the underinvestment is even more severe when access
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charges are raised (slightly) above the marginal cost of termination, since the network with
the highest quality will have more calls going out to the other network than calls coming in
from the other network and will therefore run an access revenue deficit. Since investments do
not increase gross industry profits, Valletti and Cambini (2005) find that if firms can freely
negotiate reciprocal access charges they will set it above marginal cost which would imply
even lower investment levels and inefficiently high usage fees. To induce efficient investment
levels one needs to set access charges below marginal cost of termination. In order to calculate
this optimal access fee the regulator needs information about demand. Moreover, when access
fee is set in this way, usage fee will be inefficiently low (below marginal cost). That is, to
induce dynamic efficiency one is forced to lose static efficiency.
In this subsection we adopt Valletti and Cambini’s (2005) framework of investment but
access charges are defined by our retail benchmarking rule (13). We show that for any κ ≤ 1
the rule induces firms to set usage fee equal to marginal cost. Moreover, by choosing κ
appropriately (below zero), one can induce socially efficient investment. Moreover, setting
the appropriate κ does not require knowledge of the demand function. Finally, it is shown
that firms may obtain higher net profits under this socially optimal rule than with any fixed
access fee.
Following Valletti and Cambini (2005) we assume that firms in a first stage invest in
quality ρi ≥ ρ¯ > 0, and that they afterwards compete in two-part tariffs Ti = Fi + piq. The
cost of investment is given by the convex function I(ρi). Each subscriber subscribes to exactly
one of both networks and a subscriber to network i makes ρiq(pi) calls and receives indirect
utility ρiv(pi). We first find the socially optimal investment in a symmetric equilibrium
ρi = ρj = ρ. Assume pi = pj = c, which is required by static efficiency. Then, the socially
optimal ρ is determined by maximizing ρv(c)− 2I(ρ), which gives v(c) = 2I ′(ρ).
Now we turn to the competition between the two networks. Since we will need to know
which two-part tariffs firms set when they are of different quality, we will not be able to
restrict attention at the pricing stage to symmetric equilibria. Given ρ1 and ρ2, gross profit
of network i (not including investment costs) is given by
Πi(p, w) = αi
[
(1− κ(1− αi))(ρiR(pi) + ρiv(pi)− wi − f) + κ(1− αi)(ρjR(pj) + ρjv(pj)− wj − f)
]
.
Thus
∂Πi
∂pi
= αi(1− κ(1− αi))ρi(pi − c)q′(pi)
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and we obtain again the marginal cost pricing result, independently of κ, ρi and ρj.
Fixed fees will turn out to depend on networks’ qualities. Namely, given p1 = p2 = c, we
have
∂Πi
∂wi
= σ[(1− κ(1− αi))(ρiv(c)− wi − f) + κ(1− αi)(ρjv(c)− wj − f)]
+αi[−1 + κ(1− αi) + κσ[(ρi − ρj)v(c)− wi + wj]].
The first order conditions can be solved explicitly to yield
wi =
−6 + 3κ+ 4σv(c)(2ρi + ρj) + 4κ(σv(c))2(ρi − ρj)2
12σ
− f
and
αi =
3 + 2σv(c)(ρi − ρj)
6
. (16)
Net profits in the second stage are then given by
Πi(ρi, ρj) =
(3 + 2σv(c)(ρi − ρj))2(6− κ(3 + 2σv(c)(ρi − ρj)))
216σ
− I(ρi).
Taking first order derivatives and looking for a symmetric equilibrium in qualities yields
ρi = ρ where the latter solves
I ′(ρ) = v(c)(4− 3κ)/12.
Since I(·) is convex and v(c) is positive, it follows immediately that equilibrium investment is
decreasing in κ. Letting κ = 0 corresponds exactly to Valletti and Cambini’s (2005) case of
cost based access price regulation where firms invest at the inefficiently low level determined
by I ′(ρ) = v(c)/3. By setting κ = −2/3 one obtains 2I ′(ρ) = v(c), which corresponds to
the efficient level of investment. The negative factor κ means that access charges are below
marginal cost. The intuition for the result that κ should be set below zero is similar to the
one underlying the result of Valletti and Cambini (2005) that a fixed access price should
optimally set below the termination cost, but is even clearer. Namely, in our case marginal
prices in the second stage are always equal to marginal cost. Since consumers at the higher
quality network make more calls, the higher quality network will have more outgoing than
incoming calls (independently of the market shares), so that when access charge is above
marginal cost (that is, κ > 0), it will suffer from an access revenue deficit. This reduces
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firms’ incentives to invest in the quality of their network in comparison with the situation
where access charge is equal to marginal cost (κ = 0). When access charge is below marginal
cost (that is, κ < 0), the effect is opposite and this increases firms’ incentives to invest.
An important difference with respect to Valletti and Cambini (2005) is that here we can
induce efficient investment without distorting efficient pricing, since for any κ ≤ 1, marginal
usage prices will be set to true marginal cost, independently of the qualities of the networks.
Under any fixed access charge a 6= c0, marginal usage price will be set equal to perceived
marginal cost, which is not equal to true marginal cost, and is thus necessarily inefficient.
Moreover, it makes the computation of equilibria in the investment stage very cumbersome.
Indeed, Valletti and Cambini (2005)’s main results are about marginal deviations from cost
based access charges.
Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 5 In the Hotelling model of LRT (1998a), suppose that networks invest in
quality (ρ1, ρ2) (≥ (ρ¯, ρ¯)) after the access pricing rule is determined and before they engage
in competition in two-part tariffs.
(i) For any (ρ1, ρ2) ≥ (ρ¯, ρ¯) and for any κ ≤ 1, each network chooses the variable price
equal to the marginal cost.
(ii) When κ = −2/3, each network has a socially efficient incentive to invest. In other
words, κ = −2/3 achieves both the static efficiency and the dynamic efficiency.
It is worthwhile to compare the profits of firms in the symmetric equilibrium under
our optimal benchmarking rule with κ = −2/3 with those under cost based access charges
(κ = 0). In the first case they are equal to 1/(3σ) − I(ρ∗) (where ρ∗ denotes the socially
efficient level of investment determined by I ′(ρ∗) = v(c)/2), while in the second case they
are equal to 1/(4σ) − I(ρ) (where ρ is determined by I ′(ρ) = v(c)/3). Depending on the
parameters, profits in the first case may be higher, despite the higher investments made.
For example, when I(ρ) = ρ2/2, v(p) = (10 − p)2/2, σ = 0.001, c0 = 1 and c = 2, and a
minimum level of investment is set at ρ¯ = 10. In this case the socially efficient investment
level equals ρ∗ = 16 and profit per firm equals 205.33. On the other hand, cost based access
charges (κ = 0) would lead to an investment level ρ = 10.67 and per firm profit of 193.
Finally, in case of bilateral negotiations about the reciprocal access charge, firms may be
able to agree on such high access charges that investment will be set at the minimum ρ¯ = 10.
In this case profits would be equal to 200. This illustrates that our socially optimal retail
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benchmarking approach may provide higher profits for firms than any bilaterally agreed
upon fixed access charge.
4.2.3 Heterogeneous consumers
Consider now the case of heterogeneous consumers as in Dessein (2003) and Hahn (2004).
There is a fraction µ > 0 of light consumers and a fraction 1 − µ > 0 of heavy consumers:
let θ denote the type of a consumer with θ = H,L.17 From consuming q, a θ-type consumer
obtains gross utility uθ(q) in which
u′H(q) > u
′
L(q) > 0 and u
′′
θ(q) < 0 for θ = H,L.
Given a price p, let qθ(p) denote the volume of calls chosen by a consumer of type θ; we
have qH(p) > qL(p) for any p > 0. Network i offers a menu of two-part tariffs
{
F θi , p
θ
i
}
for
θ = H,L. For simplicity, qHi = q
H(pHi ) and q
L
i = q
L(pLi ). Let vθ(p) be the indirect utility
function of type θ. We introduce the following notations:
wHi ≡ vH(pHi )− FHi , wLi ≡ vL(pLi )− FLi ;
αHi =
1
2
+ σ
(
wHi − wHj
)
, αLi =
1
2
+ σ
(
wLi − wLj
)
.
Let αi ≡ µαLi + (1− µ)αHi for i = 1, 2.
We consider again the access pricing rule in which the markup of the access price that
network i pays to the rival network is κ times its average price mark up:
ai − c0 = κ
(
µαLi
[
FLi + p
L
i q
L
i
]
+ (1− µ)αHi
[
FHi + p
H
i q
H
i
]
µαLi q
L
i + (1− µ)αHi qHi
− c
)
We will first consider the complete information case in which each consumer’s type is known
by both networks and networks can apply third degree price discrimination. We show that
in this case firms will offer exactly the same two-part tariffs to light and heavy users. This
then implies that the equilibrium under the complete information case is the equilibrium
under incomplete information.
17We consider the case with two types merely for expositional simplicity. Our result can be easily extended
to m types with m > 2.
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Network i’s profit is given by:
Πi = µα
L
i
[
(pLi − c)qLi + FLi − f
]
+ (1− µ)αHi
[
(pHi − c)qHi + FHi − f
]
(17)
−(ai − c0)(µαLi qLi + (1− µ)αHi qHi )αj
+(aj − c0)
(
µαLj q
L
j + (1− µ)αHj qHj
)
αi.
We have
(aj − c0)
(
µαLj q
L
j + (1− µ)αHj qHj
)
=
κ
{
µαLj
[
FLj + (p
L
j − c)qLj
]
+ (1− µ)αHj
[
FHj + (p
H
j − c)qHj
]}
.
Therefore,
Πi = µα
L
i (1− καj)
[
(pLi − c)qLi + FLi
]
+ (1− µ)(1− καj)αHi
[
(pHi − c)qHi + FHi
]
−αif + αiκ
{
µαLj
[
FLj + (p
L
j − c)qLj
]
+ (1− µ)αHj
[
FHj + (p
H
j − c)qHj
]}
.
It is convenient to maximize Πi with respect to (p
θ
i , w
θ
i ) instead of (p
θ
i , F
θ
i ). Then, we have:
Πi = µα
L
i (1− καj)
[
(pLi − c)qLi + vL(pLi )− wLi
]
+(1− µ)(1− καj)αHi
[
(pHi − c)qHi + vH(pHi )− wHi
]− αif
+αiκµα
L
j
[
vL(p
L
j )− wLj + (pLj − c)qLj
]
+αiκ(1− µ)αHj
[
vH(p
H
j )− wHj + (pHj − c)qHj
]
.
Maximizing pii with respect to p
θ
i given w
θ
i leads to the marginal cost pricing for all α
θ
i as
long as κ ≤ 1. When pθi = pθj = c for θ = H,L, we have
Πi = µα
L
i (1− καj)
[
vL(c)− wLi
]
+ (1− µ)(1− καj)αHi
[
vH(c)− wHi
]
−αif + αiκ
{
µαLj
[
vL(c)− wLj
]
+ (1− µ)αHj
[
vH(c)− wHj
]}
.
Taking derivatives and solving for a symmetric solution (i.e., wθi = w
θ
j for θ = L,H) yields
wθi = vθ − f +
κ− 2
4σ
,
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so that
F θi = f +
2− κ
4σ
.
Since the optimal fixed fee is identical for both consumer types when firms can discriminate
between types, it will be optimal in the case of incomplete information to offer only one
two-part tariff T = F + cq where
F =
2− κ
4σ
.
Note also that the equilibrium two-part tariff is identical to the one in the case of homoge-
neous consumers in section 4.1. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 6 In the Hotelling model of LRT (1998a), suppose that consumers are het-
erogeneous (some are light consumers and others are heavy consumers) and that networks
compete in menus of two-part tariffs without knowing each consumer’s type.
(i) For any κ ≤ 1, each network chooses the variable price equal to the marginal cost for
all types of consumers.
(ii) Given κ ≤ 1, in symmetric equilibrium, both networks offer an identical two-part
tariff (p = c, F = 2−κ
4σ
) for all types of consumers.
Dessein (2003) and Hahn (2004) find that when a = c0 (i.e., κ = 0), both networks
offer an identical two-part tariff (p = c, F = 1
2σ
) for all types of consumers. In fact, if
a = c0, as can be seen in (17), access price disappears from the profit function and the profit
function becomes the same as the one in a standard Hotelling model without interconnection.
This is why they rediscover the efficient two-part tariff result obtained by Armstrong and
Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002) in the context of competitive price discrimination
without interconnection between firms. In other words, a = c0 achieves efficiency by making
the case with interconnection similar to the case without interconnection. What we show is
that in the presence of interconnection, there is a class of access pricing rules which achieve
efficiency. Hence, interconnection provides extra instruments to achieve the static efficiency
as long as we make access prices depend on retail prices.
4.2.4 Asymmetric brand loyalty
In this subsection we consider our access pricing rule when two networks compete in two
part tariffs but one of the networks has an ”incumbent” advantage in that it offers an extra
surplus to its customers. One can think of this as asymmetric brand loyalty. We follow the
modelling of Carter and Wright (1999, 2003). That is, we will employ the two firm Hotelling
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model where consumers obtain extra surplus β/(2σ) ≥ 0 from subscribing to network 1.
Transportation cost equals t = 1/(2σ). We maintain the assumption of full coverage and do
not allow for termination based price discrimination.
We find that firms always will want to set variable price equal to marginal cost c, in-
dependent of κ and their market shares, for all κ ≤ 1. Moreover, the equilibrium market
shares will be independent of κ.
Given two part tariff (pi, Fi), the net surplus of a consumer of network i is given by:
wi = v(pi)− Fi.
Given the extra surplus from subscribing to network 1, the customer located at x is indifferent
between the two networks if and only if w1 + β/(2σ) − tx = w2 − t(1 − x). Hence, if both
networks have positive market shares, market share of network 1 equals
α1 =
β + 1
2
+ σ(w1 − w2), (18)
and network 2 has market share α2 = 1− α1.
We have the following expression for network i’s profit:
Πi(pi, Fi) = αi {[pi − c− (1− αi)(ai − c0)] q(pi) + Fi − f + αj(aj − c0)q(pj)} .
In particular, from (13) the total access payment mark-up that network i makes to network
j is given by:
αi(1− αi)(ai − c0)q(pi) = αiκ(1− αi)pii,
where pii = (pi− c)q(pi) +Fi. Therefore, the arguments we made in section 4.1 apply to the
competition among asymmetric networks: as long as (1− κ(1− αi)) ≥ 0 (which is satisfied
when κ ≤ 1), the profit maximization with respect to pi for given wi leads to marginal cost
pricing (i.e., pi = c) for any αi and for any κ ≤ 1.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium of the competition among asym-
metric networks.
Proposition 7 When 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1, 0 < β < 3, βκ < 1 and σ(> 0) is small enough, there
exists a unique equilibrium in which networks charge variable price p = c and fixed fees
F1 = f +
6 + 2β − 3κ− β2κ
12σ
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and
F2 = f +
6− 2β − 3κ− β2κ
12σ
.
Market share for firm 1 equals α1 = (3 + β)/6. Equilibrium profits are
Π1 = α1(F1 − f) + α1(1− α1)κ(F2 − F1) = (3 + β)
2
216σ
(6− κ(3 + β)),
and
Π2 = α2(F2 − f) + α2(1− α2)κ(F1 − F2) = (3− β)
2
216σ
(6− κ(3− β)).
Hence, for any 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1 we obtain efficient pricing. By varying κ we can address
and achieve further objectives, without distorting the efficient marginal cost pricing result.
An increase in κ promotes competition in terms of the fixed fee and thereby decreases the
profits of each network. Therefore, by increasing κ, the regulator or competition authority
can improve consumer welfare.
Access prices are not reciprocal, unless κ = 0. Both networks price at marginal cost
but since the incumbent network sets a higher fixed fee, he has a higher average retail price
and thus he will pay higher per minute access charges than the rival network. Note that
equilibrium market shares are independent of κ. In particular, equilibrium market shares
are the same as in Carter and Wright (2003), which basically corresponds to the case of
κ = 0. Namely, Carter and Wright (2003) argue in favor of a rule that allows the incumbent
to choose the reciprocal access price, since it will choose access price equal to the marginal
cost of terminating a call.
More generally, we can consider non-reciprocal access pricing rules for asymmetric net-
works. For instance, in our rule, we can make κ depend on a firm’s identify (i.e. κi for firm
i). Hence, we have:
αi(1− αi)(ai − c0)q(pi) = αi(1− αi)κipii;
Πi(pi, Fi) = αi {[1− κi(1− αi)] pii − f + κj(1− αi)pij}
where pii = (pi− c)q(pi) +Fi. Therefore, firm i choose pi = c for any αi > 0 and κi ≤ 1. We
conjecture that by properly choosing (κ1, κ2) the regulator can achieve the socially efficient
distribution of market shares but analyzing this is beyond the scope of this paper.
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5 Conclusion
We proposed a new approach, a retail benchmarking approach, to determine efficient access
prices for interconnected networks. Our approach is simple since we consider a set of linear
access pricing rules that linearly links the mark-up of the access price that network i pays
to its rivals with network i’s retail price mark-up. Our approach is not informationally
demanding since the regulator only needs to know the marginal costs of communication.
We showed that the efficient access pricing rules that we discovered with the benchmarking
approach have some remarkable properties with respect to what we can do with the standard
approach of fixed access prices.
First, when networks compete in linear prices without network based price discrimination,
under the standard approach (i.e., in LRT, 1998a), determining the Ramsey access price,
which is below termination cost, is informationally demanding. Since the Ramsey access
price depends on demand elasticity, the level of the Ramsey retail price and the level of the
monopoly retail price, the regulator needs to know not only the marginal costs but also the
fixed cost and the demand structure. In contrast, under our approach, there is a simple access
pricing rule that achieves the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium independently of
the underlying demand conditions. Our rule is not informationally demanding since the
regulator only needs to know the marginal costs.
Second, when networks compete in two-part tariffs in an otherwise similar framework, the
literature has obtained a static efficiency and a profit neutrality result. The static efficiency
result says that setting access price equal to the termination cost leads to marginal cost
pricing. The profit neutrality result says that firms’ equilibrium profits are equal to the
Hotelling profits for any access price. These two results provide a rationale for letting firms
choose collectively the access price as they do not have strict incentives to set a higher access
price. However, in the same setting, Valletti and Cambini (2005) find that when firms can
invest in the quality of their networks prior to setting prices, firms have an incentive to choose
an access charge larger than the termination cost in order to reduce investment incentives.
The reason is that their equilibrium profits gross of the investment costs are equal to the
Hotelling profits, because of the profit neutrality result. Furthermore, they show that static
efficiency is in conflict with dynamic efficiency since firms under-invest in quality when access
price is equal to the termination cost.
We considered a particular class of access pricing rules under which the mark-up of
the access price that network i pays to its rivals is a fraction of network i’s average retail
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price mark-up. We first showed that all of the rules in the class lead to static efficiency (i.e.,
marginal cost pricing) while the profits vary depending on the degree with which the average
retail price mark-up influences the access price mark-up. Therefore, by properly choosing this
degree, the regulator can pursue additional objectives such as improving consumer surplus
or inducing full coverage: in particular, both static efficiency and dynamic efficiency can be
achieved at the same time.
A general lesson from our approach is that benchmarking access prices to retail prices
provide extra instruments to promote competition and efficiency. In particular, our optimal
access pricing rules intensify retail competition since a network can reduce its access payment
to rival firms by reducing its own retail tariff(s). In the future, we plan to study how our
approach can be adapted to the case of network-based price discrimination.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We here complete the proof of Proposition 1 by proving that no asymmetric pure strategy
equilibria exist when firms compete in linear prices.
Lemma 1 Property 5 implies that for any firm i with positive market share αi > 0
∂Πi
∂pi
=
∂αi
∂pi
(
Πi
αi
)
+
αiR
′(pi)n
n− 1 (αi − 1/n)−
∂αi/∂pi
1− αi (Πi − αi(R(pi)− f)). (19)
Proof. Let i, j, k represent three different firms. On the one hand, from property 5, we
have, for any αj > 0
∂αk
∂pi
=
αk
αj
∂αj
∂pi
. (20)
On the other hand, from αi +
∑
k 6=i αk = 1, we have
∂αi
∂pi
+
∑
k 6=i
∂αk
∂pi
= 0. (21)
By substituting (20) into (21), we get
∂αj
∂pi
= − αj
1− αi
∂αi
∂pi
. (22)
Result (19) is now easily obtained by using (22) when computing ∂Πi
∂pi
. ¥
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Proposition 8 There is no asymmetric equilibrium (in pure strategies).
Proof. Suppose there is an asymmetric equilibrium p. Without loss of generality, we
can assume p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ pn with p1 < pn. Symmetry and monotonicity then imply that
α1 ≥ α2 ≥ . . . ≥ αn with α1 > 1/n > αn by the full coverage property.
Claim: There is no “cornered-market” equilibrium.
Proof of Claim: First, suppose that network 1 corners the market with pi1 > 0. Then,
network 2, for instance, can charge p2 = p1 and make a profit pi1/2 > 0 and therefore we get
a contradiction.
Next, suppose that network 1 corners the market with pi1 = 0. This implies that p1 = p
R
or p1 = p. If p1 = p, it follows from Property 4 that network 2 can realize a strictly positive
profit by charging p2 = p
m. Hence, we must have p1 = p
R and p2 > p
R. However, this
cannot be an equilibrium either since Lemma 1 then implies that network 1 can increase its
profit as Π′1(p
R) = R′(pR) > 0. ¥
Claim: All firms have positive market share.
Proof of Claim: Suppose not. Then αn = 0.
Case A: There is a firm i with αi(R(pi)− f) > 0.
Clearly, firm i must make nonnegative profits in equilibrium and its market share is
strictly less than 1. Hence,
0 ≤ Πi
αi(1− αi) =
R(pi)− f
1− αi +
n
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
αj
1− αi (R(pj)−R(pi)). (23)
If firm n deviates and sets price pi(< pn), firm n and firm i will have the same market
share and profits, by the symmetry property. We will show that these firms jointly will have
strictly positive profits, which then implies that the deviation by firm n is profitable. Let
pˆ denote the price vector after the deviation by firm n. Let αˆk = αk(pˆ) and Πˆk = Πk(pˆ).
Note that since the market share of any firm j 6= n, i will decrease, the sum of the market
shares of firms i and n will be higher than the market share of firm i before the deviation:
αˆi + αˆn > αi. We have
Πˆi + Πˆn = (αˆi + αˆn)
(
R(pi)− f + n
n− 1
∑
j
αˆj(R(pj)−R(pi))
)
,
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so that
2Πˆn
2αˆn(1− 2αˆn) =
R(pi)− f
1− αˆi − αˆn +
n
n− 1
∑
j 6=i,j 6=n
αˆj
1− αˆi − αˆn (R(pj)−R(pi)).
Because of Property 5, the second term on the r.h.s. is equal to the second term on the r.h.s
of equation (23). Hence,
2Πˆn
2αˆn(1− 2αˆn) = (R(pi)− f)
(
1
1− αˆi − αˆi −
1
1− αi
)
+
Πi
αi(1− αi) > 0.
The inequality follows since Πi ≥ 0 and both factors in the first term are strictly positive.
This shows that the firm without market share has an incentive to deviate and fix price
equal to the price of a firm that has positive market share and strictly positive net revenue
per consumer.
Case B: There is no firm i with αi(R(pi)− f) > 0.
In this case all firms with positive market share have zero net revenue and profits, since
the sum of firms’ profits equals the average net revenue (
∑
Πj =
∑
αj(R(pj) − f)). This
implies that all firms with positive market share set either price pR or p¯. However, this is
impossible since a firm that sets pR has an incentive to increase its price when its market
share is strictly higher than 1/n. (Its market share is at least 1/(n− 1) as it sets the lowest
price and firm n is supposed to have zero market share.)
∂Π
∂pi
=
∂αi
∂pi
(
Π
αi
)
+ αi
n
n− 1R
′(pR)(αi − 1/n)− ∂αi/∂pi
1− αi (Πi − αi(R(p
R)− f) > 0,
since the first and third term are zero and the second is strictly positive. But if all firms
except firm n set p¯, firm n can deviate and set p slightly above pR and make positive profits.
Namely, if he deviates and sets price equal to pR he will make zero profit, but his marginal
profit at these prices will then be strictly positive by the same argument as before.¥
The above shows that all firms must have positive market share in equilibrium. Note
that no firm j can charge pm in equilibrium. For such a firm R′(pm) = 0 and R(pj) ≥ R(pi)
for all i with strict inequality for at least some i. This implies then that this firm has an
incentive to lower its price as his marginal profit is strictly negative. (See equation (19)).We
now distinguish three possible cases: (I) all firms set price below pm; (II) all firms set price
above pm; and (III) some set price below pm and some set a price above pm. We will
derive a contradiction in all three cases, which then concludes the proof that no asymmetric
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equilibrium exists.
Case I: pn < p
m. In this case all firms set a price below the monopoly price and thus
R(pn) ≥ R(pj) for all j with strict inequality for some j (e.g. j = 1). Hence, Πn <
αn(R(pn)− f). Moreover, R′(pn) > 0. Equation (19) implies then that
∂Πn
∂pn
< 0.
Hence, firm n can improve his profits by lowering its price.
Case II: p1 > p
m. In this case R(p1) ≥ R(pj) for all j with strict inequality for some j
(e.g. j = n). Hence, Π1 < α1(R(p1)− f). Moreover, R′(p1) < 0. Equation (19) implies then
that
∂Π1
∂p1
< 0.
Hence, firm 1 can improve his profits by lowering its price.
Case III: For some 1 ≤ i < n we have pi < pm < pi+1. If all firms have the same (net)
revenue per consumer, the net balance of access prices equals zero for all firms, and profits
are equal to market share times net revenue per consumer. If this profit is equal to zero,
firms j ≤ i have pj = pR and firms j > i have pj = p¯. However, then the marginal profit for
firm 1 (for example) is strictly positive as the first and third term in (19) are zero and the
second term is strictly positive. Hence, if all firms have the same net revenue, net revenues
(and thus profits) have to be strictly positive for all firms.
Firms j ≤ i set some price p ∈ (pR, pm) and firms j > i set some price p′ ∈ (pm, p¯) where
R(p) = R(p′) > f . However, firm n (for example) could profitably deviate from p′ to p. This
would not affect the net balance of access prices (which remains equal to zero) and would
also not change his strictly positive net revenue per consumer. However, it would increase
his market share, and therefore its profit. Therefore, we conclude that not all firms make
the same net revenue per consumer. This of course implies that the firm with the highest
net revenue per customer has a negative net balance of access prices.
The firm with the highest net revenue per customer, R(pj) − f , must be either firm i
or firm i + 1. As argued above, its net balance of access prices must be strictly negative.
Since its profit in equilibrium must be nonnegative, this means that it must make a strictly
positive net revenue per consumer, so that its price is strictly between pR and p¯. We now
claim that it cannot be that firm i + 1 has (weakly) higher net revenue per customer than
any other firm. Namely, if that were the case, firm i+1 could deviate to p′ where p′ is defined
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as the unique price less than pm with R(p′) = R(pi+1). This would increase its market share,
and decrease the market share of any other firm by the same percentage (by Property 5).
This means that its profit per customer Πi+1/αi+1 increases, since its net balance from access
prices becomes less negative. But this then also implies that total profits increase, as its
market share increases as well.
Hence, firm i has the highest net revenue per customer and R(pi) > R(pj) for any j > i
and R(pi) > f . Note that from (19) it follows immediately that αi > 1/n, since otherwise
the marginal profit would be strictly negative and firm i would have an incentive to lower
its price.
We now show that if j > i then pj > p¯. Suppose not. We will show that then firm j will
gain by deviating to setting price pi. Namely, for any firm k we have the following expression
for profits per on-net consumer and per off-net consumer
Πk
αk(1− αk) = (R(pk)− f)(
1
1− αk −
n
n− 1) +
n
n− 1
∑
j 6=k
αj
1− αk (R(pj)− f).
Note that the last term does not change when pk is varied. Consider now k > i. If we lower
pk till p˜k = pi, revenue per customer goes up from R(pk)− f ≥ 0 till R(pi)− f > R(pk)− f .
Moreover, market share of firm k will increase and thus the second factor in the first term
will increase. This implies that
Π˜k
α˜k(1− α˜k) >
Πk
αk(1− αk) ,
where Π˜k and α˜k denote profit and market share of firm k after the deviation. Since, firm k
and firm i will have the same market share after the deviation, we must have 1/2 ≥ α˜k and
we know α˜k > αk. Therefore, we have 0 < αk(1− αk) < α˜k(1− α˜k). It follows that
Π˜k = α˜k(1− α˜k) Π˜k
α˜k(1− α˜k) > α˜k(1− α˜k)
Πk
αk(1− αk) > Πk.
Hence, the deviation is profitable.
However, Property 4 implies that αj(p) = 0 when pi < p
m and pj > p¯.
This completes the proof of Proposition 8.
Proof of Proposition 3
Since (i) is proven in the text before the proposition, we only need to prove (ii). We first
derive the unique symmetric equilibrium candidate. We will then derive conditions under
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which this candidate equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium.
Using v′(pi) = −q(pi) we obtain
∂Πi/∂pi = αiq
′(pi)(pi − c)(1− κ(1− αi)). (24)
When 1 − κ(1 − αi) > 0 and αi > 0, this derivative is negative (positive) when pi > c
(pi < c, respectively). Hence, the equilibrium price in a symmetric equilibrium must be
equal to marginal cost c.
We now focus on the derivative of profit with respect to wi.
∂Πi
∂wi
= σ
[
Πi
αi
]
+ αi(−1 + κ(1− αi) + κσ[Fi +R(pi)− Fj −R(pj)]). (25)
In a symmetric interior equilibrium (i.e. pi = p and Fi = F ), we have p = c and thus
Πi = (F − f)/2. Hence, the first order condition gives
0 = σ(F − f) + 1
2
(−1 + κ/2).
The symmetric equilibrium candidate has thus
F = f +
2− κ
4σ
.
Symmetric equilibrium profit per firm equals
Π∗ =
2− κ
8σ
.
We see that a necessary condition is κ ≤ 2. The second order derivative yields
∂2Πi
∂w2i
= 2σ[−1 + κσ(R(pi) + v(pi)− 3wi −R(pj)− v(pj) + 3wj)].
At the symmetric equilibrium candidate this is equal to −2σ and thus strictly negative for
all κ.
We now derive sufficient and necessary conditions for the symmetric equilibrium candi-
date T = F + cq to be indeed an equilibrium.
Hence, let p2 = c and F2 = F . That is, w2 = v(c)− F = v(c)− f + (κ− 2)/(4σ). First,
we know from (24) that, as long as 1− κ(1−α1) > 0, it is optimal to set p1 = c. This is the
case when κ ≤ 1 and αi > 0. The optimal w1 is then found by the first order condition at
38
w1 = w2, since the second order derivative (2σ(−1 + 3κσ(w2 − w1))) is strictly negative for
all w1 ≥ 0 as long as σ is small enough.
On the other hand, if κ > 1, network 1 can obtain unbounded profits by choosing w1
such that 1 − κ(1 − α1) < 0 by letting p1 ≈ 0. (Namely, if demand is as in LRT, then
limp1→0 v(p1) +R(p1) = −∞, and profit is unbounded from equation (15)).
It is not hard to see that there cannot be an asymmetric equilibrium. Namely, from (24)
we know that both firms will set pj = c. Substituting these prices and taking derivatives
with respect to wi yields
∂Πi
∂wi
= σ [v(c)− wi − f ] + σκ(1− 2αi)(wi − wj)− αi(1− κ(1− αi)).
Subtracting the first order derivative for firm j from that for firm i yields
0− 0 = ∂Πi
∂wi
− ∂Πj
∂wj
= −3σ(wi − wj),
so that wi = wj. This shows that there cannot be interior asymmetric equilibrium.
We now show that there is no cornered market equilibrium. Suppose, for instance, that
firm 1 corners the market. Then, we must have:
∂Π1
∂w1
∣∣∣∣
α1=1
= σ [v(c)− w1 − f ]− σκ(w1 − w2)− 1 ≥ 0;
and
∂Π2
∂w2
∣∣∣∣
α2=0
= σ [v(c)− w2 − f ]− σκ(w1 − w2) ≤ 0.
The two inequalities are equivalent to
v(c)− w2 − f ≤ κ(w1 − w2) ≤ v(c)− w1 − f − 1
σ
.
This implies
w1 − w2 ≤ − 1
σ
,
which contradicts α1 > α2 since one cannot have α1 > α2 without satisfying w1 − w2 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 7
We already explained why the equilibrium price in any equilibrium must be equal to
marginal cost c. We now focus on the derivative of profit with respect to wi, given p1 = p2 =
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c.
∂Πi
∂wi
= σ
[
Πi
αi
]
+ αi(−1 + κ(1− αi) + κσ[wj − wi)]). (26)
Hence,
0 =
∂Π1
∂w1
= σ(v(c)− w1 − f) + σκ(w1 − w2)(1− 2α1)− α1 + κα1(1− α1) (27)
and
0 =
∂Π2
∂w2
= σ(v(c)− w2 − f) + σκ(w2 − w1)(1− 2α2)− α2 + κα2(1− α2) (28)
Subtracting (28) from (27) yields
0 = σ(w2 − w1)− 2α1 + 1. (29)
Combining (18) and (29) yields the result α1 = (3+β)/6. The expressions for fixed fees and
profits follow now immediately from (27) and (28).
The second order derivative (at p1 = p2 = c) yields
∂2Π1
∂w21
= −2σ[1 + βκ+ 3κσ(w1 − w2)],
while
∂2Π2
∂w22
= −2σ[1− βκ+ 3κσ(w2 − w1)].
At the equilibrium candidate both expressions are equal to −2σ < 0.
We now derive sufficient and necessary conditions for the equilibrium candidate to be
indeed an equilibrium.
Fix network 2’s prices p2 = c and F2 as stated in the proposition. We know from (24)
that, as long as 1 − κ(1 − α1) > 0, it is optimal for network 1 to set p1 = c. This is the
case when κ ≤ 1 and αi > 0. The optimal w1 is then found by the first order condition at
w1 = v(c)− F1, since the second order derivative (−2σ(1 + βκ + 3κσ(w1 − w2))) is strictly
negative for all w1 ≥ 0 as long as σ is small enough. Similar reasoning applies when one
fixes the prices of network 1 and optimizes for network 2, as long as βκ < 1. (Note that the
second order derivative for network 2 reads −2σ(1− βκ+ 3κσ(w2 − w1)).)
It is not hard to see that there cannot be any other equilibrium. The only other possibility
would be a cornered market equilibrium. If network 2 corners the market and obtains positive
profit, then network 1 could deviate and use the same tariff and obtain positive profits. If
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network 2 corners the market but receives zero profit, then F2 = f and p2 = c. If β > 1,
network 1 can set p1 = c and F1 = f + (β − 1)/(2σ), capture the whole market and make
profits F1 − f > 0. If β ≤ 1, network 1 can set p1 = c and F1 = f + ε, obtain market share
α1 = (β + 1)/2− εσ ∈ (0, 1) and make profits per customer equal to ε(1− κ(1− α1)) > 0.
Suppose now that network 1 corners the market. Suppose, for instance, that firm 1
corners the market. Then, we must have:
∂Π1
∂w1
∣∣∣∣
α1=1
= σ [v(c)− w1 − f ]− σκ(w1 − w2)− 1 ≥ 0;
and
∂Π2
∂w2
∣∣∣∣
α2=0
= σ [v(c)− w2 − f ]− σκ(w1 − w2) ≤ 0.
The two inequalities are equivalent to
v(c)− w2 − f ≤ κ(w1 − w2) ≤ v(c)− w1 − f − 1
σ
.
This implies
w1 − w2 ≤ − 1
σ
,
which contradicts (α1 = 1, α2 = 0) for β < 3 since (α1 = 1, α2 = 0) requires w1 − w2 ≥
(1− β)/(2σ).
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